
JMF is typing
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2veDNT governance, and specifies:
All subDAOs have full control over DNT issuance parameters including overall emission schedules, inflation rates, bonus carve-outs, and stakeholder distributions (Hotspots, oracles, etc.). The only exception to this is the fixed cap of 6% DNT rewards going to veHNT stakers. The reason to keep this fixed is to avoid a scenario where DNPs compete to give more rewards to veHNT stakers at the expense of Hotspot hosts.
We had a lively discussion here leading up to HIP-76 on how this should be interpreted, and to what extent the rules specified and clarified in HIP-76 relating to HNT lockup to veHNT would apply to subDAO governance through DNT lockup and veDNT.
In the end, we reached a consensus that while it was appropriate for HIP-76 to modify and/or clarify initial parameters of veDNT lockup mechanics as previously set by other HIPs, subDAOs should have the authority to modify these parameters going forward. More generally, subDAOs should have the authority to control the tokenomics of their DNT, as quoted above from HIP-51.
In my view, this is a good reason to call them subDAOs, as they have full authority over their subDAO token (DNT), even though they depend on the Helium DAO where the issuance of HNT to the subDAO treasury is concerned. For example, if the Helium DAO finds that a subDAO is gaming its Utility Score, the Helium DAO may slash the HNT reserves of the subDAO. However, the Helium DAO has no authority over the subDAO’s DNT.veDNT governance, and specifies:
All subDAOs have full control over DNT issuance parameters including overall emission schedules, inflation rates, bonus carve-outs, and stakeholder distributions (Hotspots, oracles, etc.). The only exception to this is the fixed cap of 6% DNT rewards going to veHNT stakers. The reason to keep this fixed is to avoid a scenario where DNPs compete to give more rewards to veHNT stakers at the expense of Hotspot hosts.
We had a lively discussion here leading up to HIP-76 on how this should be interpreted, and to what extent the rules specified and clarified in HIP-76 relating to HNT lockup to veHNT would apply to subDAO governance through DNT lockup and veDNT.
In the end, we reached a consensus that while it was appropriate for HIP-76 to modify and/or clarify initial parameters of veDNT lockup mechanics as previously set by other HIPs, subDAOs should have the authority to modify these parameters going forward. More generally, subDAOs should have the authority to control the tokenomics of their DNT, as quoted above from HIP-51.
In my view, this is a good reason to call them subDAOs, as they have full authority over their subDAO token (DNT), even though they depend on the Helium DAO where the issuance of HNT to the subDAO treasury is concerned. For example, if the Helium DAO finds that a subDAO is gaming its Utility Score, the Helium DAO may slash the HNT reserves of the subDAO. However, the Helium DAO has no authority over the subDAO’s DNT.
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\"gateway"\ ? or \"gateway\" ? (edited)V = max(1, sqrt(veHNT))
though of course there are alternatives, but I don’t remember any convincing proposal there. As I did show previously, the sqrt(veHNT) factor does in fact give a better path to entry for new subDAOs, which you had been advocating for. So while HIP-80 does currently propose a formula for the Score that includes the sqrt(veHNT) term, that could be changed, or that V factor could be used with the formula given in HIP-51, or a different one. If you like sqrt(veHNT) too, then that’s great, we could agree on that. Or perhaps you would like to propose a different V factor? (edited)
11 and use that as a forcing function to resolve the issue?1 and use that as a forcing function to resolve the issue?
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1D = max(1, sqrt(DC Burn per epoch))
Also note that this means something different now than when HIP-51 was written, as there are now 30 epochs in a month and not 30*48 = 1,440. (edited)D = max(1, sqrt(DC Burn per epoch))
Also note that this means something different now than when HIP-51 was written, as there are now 30 epochs in a month and not 30*48 = 1,440. (edited)D = max(1, sqrt((DC Burn per epoch)/48))) Just sayin’. So I guess 48 is also not a magic number. (edited)
1D = max(1, sqrt((DC Burn per epoch)/48))) Just sayin’. So I guess 48 is also not a magic number. (edited)
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11 for A score if we stick to HIP-51 (edited)1 for A score if we stick to HIP-51 (edited)
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1HIP80_FLOOR_A = 40
HIP80_FLOOR_B = 7
DEVICES_A = 400000
DEVICE_COST_A = 40
DEVICES_B = 3500
DEVICE_COST_B = 10
It shows the % of rewards IOT gets for HIP51/80 on Z, X and Y are IOT and MOBILE burn respectively. V is constant as well as A (for HIP51). (edited)HIP80_FLOOR_A = 40
HIP80_FLOOR_B = 7
DEVICES_A = 400000
DEVICE_COST_A = 40
DEVICES_B = 3500
DEVICE_COST_B = 10
It shows the % of rewards IOT gets for HIP51/80 on Z, X and Y are IOT and MOBILE burn respectively. V is constant as well as A (for HIP51). (edited)HIP80_FLOOR_A = 40
HIP80_FLOOR_B = 7
DEVICES_A = 400000
DEVICE_COST_A = 40
DEVICES_B = 3500
DEVICE_COST_B = 10
It shows the % of rewards IOT gets for HIP51/80 on Z, X and Y are IOT and MOBILE burn respectively. V is constant as well as A (for HIP51). (edited)
1If you looked at the graphs at all you would’ve seen I posted them up to 1M
and I quite honestly don’t see it.
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Given that PR #606 proposes a linear count of veHNT rather than the square root count proposed in HIP-80, that [lazy stake] is less of an issue [in PR #606] than it would be in HIP-80.
In the context of HIP-80, my observation was that:
- In a successful Helium DAO, with $10M/month DC Burn, a dead network would receive 1.2% of emissions under HIP-80.
- I view that as an opportunity cost (risk) of inviting future subDAOs into the Helium DAO. The attractive on-ramp provided by the “7” coefficient is another risk, as it provides HNT emissions to potential future subDAOs pre-revenue, which is what it is designed to do. (MOBILE, until Helium Mobile launches, is a pre-revenue subDAO in this sense as well.)
The on-ramp addresses comments from Max that he is finding it challenging to convince potential TIPIN projects to consider becoming a Helium subDAO because it is economically unattractive to them.
- Ultimately, Helium DAO has the final authority to eject subDAOs if it is found that they don’t bring value to the DAO. That wouldn’t necessarily kill the project either, they could simply fork and continue under their own token, as Max has pointed out in reference to Helium MOBILE.
The Helium DAO only works if it provides advantages to both stronger and weaker networks, and if it provides a sum that is greater than its parts. That’s what the Helium Flywheel is supposed to do, combined with the ultimate mechanism of Burn & Mint Equilibrium over Net Emissions. (Which BTW I think is genius.) (edited)Given that PR #606 proposes a linear count of veHNT rather than the square root count proposed in HIP-80, that [lazy stake] is less of an issue [in PR #606] than it would be in HIP-80.
In the context of HIP-80, my observation was that:
- In a successful Helium DAO, with $10M/month DC Burn, a dead network would receive 1.2% of emissions under HIP-80.
- I view that as an opportunity cost (risk) of inviting future subDAOs into the Helium DAO. The attractive on-ramp provided by the “7” coefficient is another risk, as it provides HNT emissions to potential future subDAOs pre-revenue, which is what it is designed to do. (MOBILE, until Helium Mobile launches, is a pre-revenue subDAO in this sense as well.)
The on-ramp addresses comments from Max that he is finding it challenging to convince potential TIPIN projects to consider becoming a Helium subDAO because it is economically unattractive to them.
- Ultimately, Helium DAO has the final authority to eject subDAOs if it is found that they don’t bring value to the DAO. That wouldn’t necessarily kill the project either, they could simply fork and continue under their own token, as Max has pointed out in reference to Helium MOBILE.
The Helium DAO only works if it provides advantages to both stronger and weaker networks, and if it provides a sum that is greater than its parts. That’s what the Helium Flywheel is supposed to do, combined with the ultimate mechanism of Burn & Mint Equilibrium over Net Emissions. (Which BTW I think is genius.) (edited)
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(edited)
GM, GA, GE!! HIP 80 and 81 are open for a vote and will be open for 5 days! Please read the entirety of the announcement in #announcements and cast both of your votes on helium.vote
1capcom has proposed that we could lose 80 or even 90% of the current total . that is bieng used here in the context IMHO that lora iot wont go any further than it is ( wont bring dc burn to the table with onboarding ) however this is not the case at all . to complete the iot network theres still plenty of new hotspots that need to come online in GOOD locations.capcom has proposed that we could lose 80 or even 90% of the current total . that is bieng used here in the context IMHO that lora iot wont go any further than it is ( wont bring dc burn to the table with onboarding ) however this is not the case at all . to complete the iot network theres still plenty of new hotspots that need to come online in GOOD locations. If both pass, then a selection rule will govern: the HIP with the greater HNT vote power will be adopted.If both pass, then a selection rule will govern: the HIP with the greater HNT vote power will be adopted.
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10.000_01 (edited)
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) They can only muster a little bit of veHNT, and they will get squashed if we count the linear amount of veHNT.
Now if we take the square root of veHNT, Dabba gets a bit more of a chance. (Remember, they’re also getting the Floor of 7 here as support.)
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1Honestly, if MOBILE doesn’t start making revenue within some reasonable timeframe, we’re all fucked anyway. why cause lorawan cant stand on its own 2 feet . it needs mobile to prop it up ?
1Honestly, if MOBILE doesn’t start making revenue within some reasonable timeframe, we’re all fucked anyway. why cause lorawan cant stand on its own 2 feet . it needs mobile to prop it up ? Honestly, if MOBILE doesn’t start making revenue within some reasonable timeframe, we’re all fucked anyway. why cause lorawan cant stand on its own 2 feet . it needs mobile to prop it up ? 
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#hip-80-simplifying-dao-utility-score has been locked!
#hip-80-simplifying-dao-utility-score has been unlocked!
#hip-80-simplifying-dao-utility-score has been locked!